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Summary findings
Using a model of wealth distribution dynamics and  Creating new markets in services that are also supplied
occupational choice, Ferreira investigates the  by the public sector may also contribute to an increase in
distributional consequences of policies and developments  inequality. So can labor market reforms that lead to a
associated with the transition from central planning to a  decompression of the earnings structure and to greater
market system.  flexibility in employment.
The model suggests that even an efficient privatization  The results underline the importance of retaining
designed to be egalitarian may lead to increases in  government provision of basic public goods and services,
inequality (and possibly poverty), both during the  removing barriers that prevent the participation of the
transition and in the new steady state.  poor in the new private sector, and ensuring that suitable
safety nets are in place.
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1.  Introduction.
In 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, some 2.2 million people lived on
less than U$1-a-day (in 1985 prices, using PPP exchange rates for each country) in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In  1993 - a mere six years later  - with
economic reform in full swing throughout the region, that number had risen almost
sevenfold  to 14.5 million. 2 Over this period, and with respect to that poverty line, the
region had recorded  by far the largest  increase  in poverty (as measured  by the headcount)
of any region of the world, even if it still had the lowest average headcount in the
developing  world.
This unprecedented  increase in serious poverty, in a region where it had been almost
eradicated,  was due fundamentally  to two effects of economic  transition on its income
distributions:  a fall in average  household  incomes,  sustained  during the period of output
collapse; and an increase in income and expenditure inequality, which is almost as
pervasive  a feature  of the transition  process as the first. But even if the declines  in output
- which took place in every country  in the region, albeit to different  extents (see EBRD,
1995)  - may  have been the main culprits  for the increases  in poverty,  they may prove  less
persistent. The output declines have now been completely or partially reversed in a
number  of transition  economies,  and the others look set to follow suit. Though  they were
severe and their impact  on living standards  was dramatic,  they were essentially  transitory
phenomena;  part of the transitional  dynamics  in moving from one steady-state  to another,
rather than  characteristics  of the new steady-state.
The same can not so confidently be said of the  substantial increases in  inequality.
Transition  economies,  whether in Eastern  Europe  and the FSU or elsewhere,  consistently
reported some of the largest increases in Gini coefficients  between the early 1980s and
the early 1990s  among  the countries  in the Deininger  and Squire international  inequality
2 According  to the  World  Bank  (1996).3
data-set.  Poland's  Gini  rose  by  7.3  percentage points  (pp) between  1982 and  1993;
Hungary's was up by 6.9pp over the same period; Russia's rose by 5.9pp in  1980-1993.
The  Chinese  Gini  rose  by  7.3pp  between  1981  and  1994.  And  there  has  been  no
indication that this trend is about to be reversed.
Despite data limitations, much has already been written on this distributional effect, and a
considerable  body  of  empirical  evidence  is  emerging  on  the  dynamics  of  income
distributions  in  transition  economies,  through  works  such  as those  by  Atkinson  and
Micklewright  (1992),  Commander  and  Coricelli  (1995)  and  Milanovic  (1997).  The
picture  of  widespread and  pronounced  increases  in  income,  expenditure  or  earnings
inequality which arises from this evidence is remarkable, particularly when contrasted
with the general stability of income distributions in most other countries for which data is
available. Based on their recent  international compilation of inequality measures from
household survey data sets, Deininger and Squire (1996) found that inequality does not
tend  to  vary  a  great  deal over  time  within given  countries - though  it  varies rather
dramatically across countries. 3 The recent experience of economies in transition, with 5-
7.5 percentage point rises in Gini coefficients not uncommon, is clearly exceptional.
What lies behind it? What is it about the process of transition from central planning to a
market  system  which  appears to  involve  an  inherent  increase  in  inequality?  Is  this
increase likely to be transitory, or  could it be permanent? What policy reforms  in the
menus suggested to governments are likely to cause these increases in income dispersion?
How do they do so? This paper seeks to  suggest some answers to these questions, by
investigating the effects of policies and processes associated with economic transition on
the equilibrium distribution generated by a model of wealth distribution dynamics with
imperfect capital markets. It relies on a variant of the model discussed in Ferreira (1995),
"The  measures  are  relatively  stable  through  time,  but  they  differ  substantially  across  regions,  a result  that
emerges  for individual  countries  as well [... ]The  average  standard  deviation  within  countries  (in a
sample  of countries  for which  at least four observations  are available)  is 2.79, compared  with a
standard  deviation  for  the  country-specific  means  of 9.15."  (Deininger  and  Squire,  1996,  p. 583.)4
which draws on insights developed  in a growing literature,  including  works by Aghion
and Bolton  (1997), Banerjee  and Newman (1991 and 1993),  Benabou  (1996), Galor and
Zeira (1993) and Piketty (1997). It is hoped that some of the propositions  arising from
this conceptual exercise might be of  use in  suggesting fruitful avenues for future
empirical  research  into the causes  of growing  inequality  in transition  economies.
Income  distributions  are determined  by the underlying  distributions  of assets,  and by the
rates of returns on those assets. One can think of a household's income as the inner
product  of the vector  of assets it owns (land; shares;  bonds; the skills of its members)  and
the vector of prevailing returns on those assets (rent, actual or imputed; dividends;
interest;  the wage  rates accruing  to the different  skills). In an uncertain  world, some  or all
of these returns may be stochastic,  so that there is a probability  distribution  associated
with each of them, and consequently  a  random component to  the determination of
incomes. In principle, therefore, changes in the distribution  of income can be due to
changes in the distribution of ownership of one or more assets, or to changes in the
returns associated  with them, or yet to changes in the probability  distributions  associated
with shocks inherent to the income generating process. In the sweeping changes of
transition  in Eastern Europe  and the FSU, it is likely that all three types of changes  have
played  (and continue  to play) a role.
This paper focuses on three groups of possible sources  of changes  in the distribution  of
income:  the privatization  of public assets;  the development  of new markets in privately-
provided substitutes  to public  services  (e.g. telephones,  schools,  health-care);  and changes
in the returns associated  with different  skills (i.e. on the earnings-education  profile). The
first of these leads to a change in the underlying  distribution  of asset ownership,  but we
will show that it is also likely to impact on wages in the public sector, thus affecting
returns. Privatization  can be shown to affect the distribution of income by changing
ownership,  wages and occupational  choices. The creation of new markets in privately-
provided  substitutes  to public services  will be shown  to affect  the returns on assets,  and to
do so differently  for different  wealth levels. The new markets  are likely to enable richer5
agents  to top-up  public  provision,  thus increasing  the expected  returns from their assets as
compared  to poorer agents. Finally, increases  in the returns to education  and skills, as
well as the greater  volatility  associated  with employment  and earnings  in a flexible  labour
market,  are likely  to lead  to increases  in earnings  inequality.
Although we consider both short-term and long-term impacts of  these changes, the
analysis ignores a  number of  transitory effects which may well have contributed
substantially  to  the  increases in  inequality and poverty early on  in  the process of
transition. Notable amongst these were increases in the rate of inflation, which were
known to have hurt those on fixed incomes who did not have the political clout to
readjust  them often (e.g. pensioners  and some public employees),  much more than those
able to readjust  their prices  more frequently. 4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model: it describes  the
supply  and demand side characteristics  of agents,  the government  sector and the financial
markets;  section  2.1 outlines  the static  equilibrium  of the model,  by describing  the actions
and incomes of all agents as functions  of their initial wealth and of a random variable;
section  2.2 relies on those income processes  to characterize  the transitional  dynamics  of
this stochastic  system and the (steady-state)  limiting distribution  to which it converges.
Section 3 considers  the effects of privatizing part (or all) of the state-owned  productive
assets: it first investigates  the short-term  effects, through  impacts  on public-sector  wages
on the one hand, and higher income from (privatized) capital on the other; then it
considers  the permanent  changes  after the one-off windfalls  from privatization  have been
absorbed into the dynamics of the system. Section 4 introduces markets for privately-
provided substitutes to  public services. This reform is found to  add to  economic
efficiency,  as was to be expected  from eliminating  a missing market  problem,  but also to
add to inequality.  Section 5 provides  an informal  discussion  of the factors  likely to affect
4 See Ferreira and Litchfield (1997) for an empirical analysis of the effects of high inflation on the
Brazilian income distribution in the 1980s.6
the returns to different  skills, and hence the returns to education  and the distribution  of
earnings.  Section  6 summarizes  the findings  of the paper  and concludes.
2.  The ModeL
Let there be a continuum  of agents with wealth  distributed  in [0, ul, with total mass 1. At
any time t, their distribution  is given  by Gt  (w), which  gives the measure of the population
with wealth  less than w. G, (u) = 1 for all t. These infinitesimal  agents can be thought of
as household-firms,  identical to one another in every respect other than initial wealth.
Their size is normalized  to one. Each agent is risk-neutral,  lives for one period and has
one offspring.  The sequential  pattern  of their lives is as illustrated  in Figure 1  below:
Figure 1:
I  I  I  I  I  l
birth  receive  invest  receive  pay tax  consume
(receive  any transfers  return  reproduce
bequest)  bequeath,  die
There is a single consumption  good in the model, which can be stored costlessly  across
periods.  Agents  seek to maximize:
U(c, ,b, ) = hc,a  b,-a  (O<a<l)  (1)
where ct denotes the agent's total consumption  in period t (her life), and bt denotes the
bequest she leaves her only child. The formulation  in  (1) implies the "warm-glow"
bequest motive (see Andreoni, 1989). This  is  clearly a  short-cut approach to  full
intertemporal  optimization,  but it is one which  has been extensively  used in the literature,
given the simple dynamic structure  it implies for the wealth process. It is not entirely
innocuous,  and replacement  with full intertemporal  optimization  - where the Keynes-
Ramsey rule holds - would change the  model and generate additional insights. A
discussion  of the implications  for this model is contained  in Ferreira  (1996).7
On the supply side, agents may choose between two alternative occupations: they may be
public sector employees, working for a deterministic wage o, or they may set up on their
own as private  sector entrepreneurs,  in  which  case they  face  a  stochastic production
function given by:'
Yt  = 0  if k < k'  (2)
yt= 0t rkt  ifk2k'
where k is private capital and 0 is a random variable distributed as follows:
0 = 1  with probability  q
0 = 0  with probability  1-q  and  q:= v-'(g/k)
g denotes the quantity of public capital used in the production process. The important
properties of v are that it is defined on domain  [0, 1], and that v'  >  0. But it will be
convenient to assume the following specific form for v:  g/k  = qy  , where O<a<1.  This
implies that  q = (g/k)a,  and that
E(y, Ik  > k') = rklaga.  (2')
Once one of these two occupations is chosen, agents are assumed to allocate their full
effort to  it, and to  it alone,  so that effort  supply is completely  inelastic, and  convex
combinations of  the two activities are ruled out.
Before turning to the capital markets  and the role of government, it may be useful to
spend  a  moment  discussing  the  stochastic  private  sector  production  function  just
described. In this private sector, there is a minimum scale of production,  given by an
amount of private capital k'  > 0. This non-convexity in the production set captures the
minimum costs of going into business, which can range from the cost of a plot of land, or
an industrial plant in which to locate machines, to the cost of a licence to operate a kiosk
or of a stall on which to display vegetables in a street market.5 Once that minimum scale
Similar  minimum  scale  or more  restrictive  fLxed  scale  assumptions  are  common  in the  literature.  See  e.g.
Aghion  and Bolton  (1997), Galor  and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee  and Newman  (1993).8
has been reached, agents face stochastic returns to private capital, where the probability
of success rises with the ratio of public capital to private capital. This is meant to capture
both the uncertainties  and risks associated  with private  sector activity, as  well as the
complementarity  between certain types  of public  and private  capital,  which has  been
frequently noted in the growth literature (see e.g. Barro, 1990 and Stern, 1991.)
The nature of 'public capital' g requires elaboration. Just as there is an enormous array of
goods  and  services  in  the  world,  all  of  which  are  subsumed  under  the  aggregate
consumption  composite  c, there  also  exists a  large  and complex  range of non-labour
inputs into production, which are routinely lumped together in macro models as 'capital'.
It has long been recognized both that there are externalities associated with at least some
6 types of capital ,  and that different types of capital can be complements (computers and
education of those using them) or substitutes (delivery vans and delivery motorcycles).
Combining these two  ideas, let us divide  the various  forms of capital into two broad
groups: forms of capital with limited or no externality generation are aggregated as k and
called private capital. It is hard to think of justifications for public provision of this sort of
capital in a fully functioning market system in which the usual efficiency advantages of
private  producers  over  the  public  sector  are  present.  Other  forms  of  capital  are
characterized by high positive externalities associated with their use or production (the
best examples may be forms of human capital, such as education and health, or physical
infrastructure  capital  with  a  strong  network  dimension,  such  as  streets, rural  roads,
telecommunications or power). These are aggregated as g, and named  'public  capital'.
What defines g is the presence of positive externalities in production or use. These inputs
are not  public  goods: they are in  fact assumed  to  be excludable  in  use.  Two  things
follow: first, there may be justification for public involvement in producing (or financing)
6Famous  for  having  enabled  modelers  to combine  constant  returns  to an accumulatable  factor  and
competition,  helping  to endogenize  growth  in per capita  output;  see  Arrow  (1962)  and Romer  (1986).
Some  may  be club  goods,  in that  they  are  excludable  but non-rivalrous.9
some of this capital directly, because government failures (e.g. red-tape or shirking) may
be outweighed by market failures (externalities or high transaction costs). Second, there
will  nevertheless  be  scope  for  private  production  of  some  of  this  capital  too.  Our
aggregate public capital g is likely to be produced both by public and by private sector
agents, as is indeed the case with education services, health care or telecommunication
services. 8
Whoever produces it, 'public capital'  contributes to private production in this stochastic
setting by raising the probability of its success: the better the health care available to your
farm labourers, the less likely they are to  succumb to  a preventable epidemic, leaving
crops untended; the more reliable the power supply and the telephone system, the less
likely it is that consumers will be disappointed by your own reliability; the better the rural
roads (g), the likelier it is that your lorry (k) will deliver produce to market. 9 In this sense,
private and public capital are therefore complements in the stochastic production function
of the private sector. Given the specific form assumed for the v function, the expected
output from private-sector production turns out to be homogeneous of degree one in k and
g-
Let us now turn to the role of the governnent.  This role is perhaps the most important
thing that  changes in the process of  transition  from central planning and  government
ownership of the means of production to a market economy. It may therefore be helpful
to  describe three plausible  governments,  one  for each  stage of the transition: before,
during and after.
Government B is the stylized picture of the owner of all means of production. It combines
labour and capital according to the Leontieff production function:
8  We explore  the consequences  of allowing  for this 'topping-up' of public  capital  from private  sources  in a
later  section.
The probability  is a function  of g/k: if your lorry is a 30-ton  articulated  container  truck, it needs  better
roads  to make  it to the market.10
Xi = min(crS,,)LLs,)  (3)
where X denotes  the output of the state sector, S denotes  the stock of capital used by the
government,  and L. denotes  the size of public sector  employment.  The practice of labour
hoarding, which is  widely documented to  have been common in  centrally planned
a
economies,  is incorporated  by assuming  that L,, > - S,,  so that in effect X, = aS,.  For
simplicity,  assume that S does not depreciate.  Government  B has discretion  on how to
distribute output X,. One plausible such distribution  rule, compatible  with the ideal of
equality  of outcomes,  is to set wages  equal to the average  product  of labour:
X,  aS,
Lst  Lst
Equation (4) is a distribution  rule, a wage setting equation and, since this government
administers all production and has no need to tax, it is also Government  B's  budget
constraint.  One can think of the wage X  as incorporating  any in-kind benefits, such as
child or health care, made available to public sector workers in this economy.  In this
benchmark  case, no g is produced,  so that there is no private sector. Public employment
exhausts the total labour force: L. = L. There is perfect income equality with a Dirac
distribution  at o.
Government  A is the stylized  benevolent government  in a mature market economy. In
such an economy, there are govemment failures (particularly pervasive in producing
consumption  goods or private capital, so that these are produced  by private agents) and
market failures (which outweigh  government  failures in the production of some goods,
which are here all assumed  to be in the public-capital  category).  This government  seeks
9
to maximize  a linear  social welfare  function  given by: W = fy(w,O)dG(w) subject  to:
0
gg JdG(w) = T Jy(w,O)dG(w)  (5)
0  011
The budget  constraint  in equation (5) summarizes  four key (assumed)  restrictions  in the
policy choices  available  to benevolent  government  A. First, the government  can not levy
lump-sum taxes. Hence, in this set-up with inelastic labour supply, income taxes are
quasi-lump-sum  and are preferable  to taxing either  consumption  or bequests  only,  or both
at different rates.' 0 Second,  the government  can only tax incomes proportionately,  at a
constant rate x, without exceptions.  Third, the government  can not make cash transfers.
Fourth, the government  can not target the in-kind transfers of public capital which it
makes (perhaps due to the administrative  costs involved).  These are hence distributed
uniformly to  all  agents, who receive an amount g5."  The transformation  from tax
revenues  into in-kind  transfers  of public capital  is deliberately  not modeled  explicitly:  it
may be more efficient  for the government  to finance production  by private agents, or it
may produce them directly, through some implicit production function using the tax
revenues.
The third kind of government,  D, is a hybrid of the other two. It is a government in
transition,  and hence combines  functions  from both B and A. It retains  a sector  producing
the consumption  good c, with technology (3), and a modem sector producing public
capital goods g, which it distributes uniformly to  the population, like A. Its budget
constraint  is given by:
o°L, + gg |dG(w)  =T  w,O)dG(w) + X  (6)
0  0
I continue  to assume that the public-sector  wage is set in accordance  to (4), so that there
is no cross-subsidy  between  the two sectors  of this transitional  government.  I also assume
that gg  has been historically  determined  at some exogenous  level (perhaps  by some vote
10  Given  preferences  in equation  (1), taxing  c and b at identical  rates is equivalent  to taxing  incomes.  For a
discussion  of the public  economics  of this model,  see Ferreira  (1996).
11Since JdG(w) = 1, the reader  can for the moment  think of g8 either  as an amount  of an (excludable)
0
private  good  uniformly  distributed  to all agents,  or alternatively  as the amount  of a (non-excludable
and non-rivalrous)  public  good,  which  any agent  can use in his or her production  function.  This
second  interpretation  must only  be abandoned  in Section  4.12
early in the process of transition)  and r adjusts to satisfy (6).  12 Since we are concerned
with the process of economic  transition,  in the analysis  below govermment  will always be
this government  D.
Finally,  I assume that credit markets  work imperfectly.  The important  requirement  is that
there exist credit ceilings linked to agents' initial wealth levels. This can be obtained
through a  set-up like  that  in  Banerjee and Newman (1993), based on  imperfect
enforcement  of repayments,  but the insights  are the same if the credit  markets are simply
assumed  away altogether.  For simplicity,  this is the route taken below, where we assume
agents can not borrow (or lend) at all. Savings are simply stored and, like capital or
bequests,  do not depreciate.
2.1.  The  Static  Equilibrium.
The objective  of this sub-section  is to determine  how the occupational  choice between
public and private sectors is made by each agent, and to describe  her end-of-period  (pre-
tax) income as a function of her initial wealth level and of her drawing of the random
variable  theta. This will allow us to characterize  the transition  function of wealth, which
will provide  the basis for investigating  the long-run  dynamic  properties  of the system.  To
focus on an economy  in transition,  I assume that the government  is Government  D. The
existence  of a minimum scale requirement  for private sector production  (k 2 k') implies
that there will be three classes in this simple version of the model, subject to  the
following  restriction:
Assumption 1: Given the private sector rate of return r,  the historic level of  gg is
sufficiently  high in relation to the productivity  of labour in the public sector that, at the
12  The more satisfactory  approaches  of modeling  the choice  of T explicitly  in a voting  framework,  or
alternatively  assuming  a benevolent  dictator  which  maximizes  social  welfare  by choice  of an optimal
r*, introduce  too much complexity  for the purposes  of this paper. However,  see Ch. 4 in Ferreira
(1996)  for a cut at the latter  approach.  The alternative  route of fixing  Xr  at some exogenous  level  here
is just as unsatisfactory,  and would  add unnecessary  complications.13
minimum scale of private production,  expected end-of-period income is higher in the
private sector than in the public sector. In other words, if we denote (pre-tax) income in
the private sector yp and income in the public sector yG:
E[yIw=  k' ]> E[yGIw= k']
rkt-ag'  >co  + k  = aS +k,  (7)
9  ~Ls
In addition to this assumption, we will also need one more result to fully characterize the
three social classes. Let wu denote the upper bound of the wealth interval supporting the
ergodic  distribution  G*,  the  limiting  wealth  distribution  towards  which  the  system
converges. w%  is defined below in equation (10).
Lemma  1: The upper  bound of the  support of the  limiting wealth distribution, w.,  is
sufficiently high that the marginal product of capital there is below 1:
E[MPk(w.  )] < I  =>  r(l -a)w.-  g.. < 1
Proof: See Appendix.
Figure 2 below illustrates the meaning of Assumption  1 and Lemma 1. Assumption  1
requires that the expected income from private sector production at k' be greater than the
(riskless) income which can be derived from working as a public sector employee. The
latter is equal to the wage a) plus the initial wealth (the return on which is 1, since there
are  no  capital  markets  and  no  depreciation).  Lemma  1 establishes that  the  expected
marginal product of capital in private production (the convex curve in the bottom panel of
Figure 2) is less than 1 at the upper bound of the wealth interval supporting the ergodic
distribution (we). If we implicitly define w, as E[MPk (wj)] = 1, then it requires that wC  <
wU.14
Figure  2




E[MPk] =  r(I-a)k"aga
Wc  k
We can now describe end-of-period incomes for all agents, as follows:
Proposition 1: In the economy described so far, there are three classes of agents, defined
by their occupation  and sector of employment:  the poorest agents, with wealth w < k',
work in the public sector for a deterministic wage aD.  All agents with wealth greater than
or equal to k' choose to become entrepreneurs  in the risky private sector. But there are
two classes of entrepreneurs:  those with wealth  between  k' and wC  invest all their wealth
in the production  function (2); while those with wealth greater than wC  save some of it.
The end-of-period  (pre-tax)  income function  is therefore  given  by:15
y,(w,,0,)=  o,  +w,  for w, e[O,k')
0 ,rw,  for w, e[k',wC)  (8)
0 rw, +  (w, - W)  for w,  E[WC  ,u]
Proof: 1) Agents  with wealth  w < k' work in the public  sector  because:
E[yG  I w < k'] = o + w > E[yp  I w < k']  = 0. The first equality  arises from earning  wage
co from one's labour in the public sector and saving one's initial wealth. The second
equality  arises  from the minimum  scale  requirement  in production  function  (2).
2) Agents with wealth k'  < w < w, invest their full wealth in the private sector
because:
* Assumption  1 ensures  that it is worth investing  at least  k' in the private  sector,  and
* Lemma 1 and the fact that  E[  MPk] < 0, Vk ensure that it is also preferable  to invest
ak
any wealth  up to wc,  rather than to save it. Once  they invest their full wealth  w (> k') in
production  function  (2),  their return is Ot  rk,.
3) Agents  with wealth w > w; find it profitable  to invest wC  in the private sector
because  rw-g'>  co  + w.,  which  follows  from  Assumption  1,  Lemma  1 and  the
monotonicity  of MPk. Given Lemma 1, however, it is clearly optimal for them to save
(w- wc)  rather than invest  it.
2.2.  Transitional Dynamics and the Steady-State Distribution.
The utility function in (1), implies that bequests are a fixed proportion  of the after-tax
end-of-period income for each and every agent: b, = (1 - a XI - X)y,  , where yt is defined
in equation (8) above. Since bt = wt+i for each lineage, the intergenerational  law of
motion of wealth  in this model  can be written  simply  as:
w,+,  = (1-  a)(l-,)y,(w,  0,)  (9)16
where y, (w, ,O,  ) is defined in equation (8).
Otis  not i.i.d., because it is not identically distributed over time, since the probability q (
v I(g/k)) may change from period to period. Nevertheless, since g, is predetermined and kt
depends only on the current (period t) value of wealth, Ot is independently distributed. a
and T are time invariant exogenous parameters. It follows that there are no indirect links
between previous values of w and wt+j or, in other words, that for any set A of values of
wealth,  Pr (wt+ E A I wt, w  wtl,...,  w  ,...)  = Pr (wt+ 1 E  A I  wi). The transition process of
wealth  is  therefore  a  unidimensional  Markov  process,  which  allows  us  to  be  fairly
specific about the long-run properties of this dynamic stochastic system, as shown by the
following proposition:
Proposition 2: The stochastic process defined by equation (9) is a Markov process, with
the  property that the  cross-section distribution  Gt(w) converges to  a unique  invariant
limiting distribution G*, from any initial distribution Go(w).
Proof  See the proof of proposition 3 in (the appendix to) Ferreira (1995).
It is intuitive to see that the upper bound of the ergodic wealth set (the support of G*)
must be  the highest level  of wealth which  generates a bequest no  smaller than itself.
Substituting y, (w,,O,) =  O,rw,  + (w, - w,)  - for  w, e [w,  u] and 0 = 1 - from equation
(8) into (9), and requiring that wt+I  = wt solves for wu:
WI, =  (I  a)(I-)r-lW  (10)
where, of course, Lemma 1 implies that  (I1  X  1)  > 1.
Figure  3  below  illustrates the  wealth  transition  function  given  by  equation  (9).  The
bequests  left by agents in  each class are  simply a  fraction (1 -a)(1 -'r) of  their end-of-17
period incomes,  as given by (8). While  there is a single bequest  function  in [0, k'), where
incomes are deterministic,  there are two in [k', wj,  one for 0 =0 and one for 0 =1. The
slope of the bequest function is therefore  (1-a)(1-')  in [0, k') and  for both functions  in
[wc,wj].  For the middle-class  in [k', wj] the function  for 0 =0 is a constant  at zero, while
the upper line (for 0 =1) has a slope  of (l-a)(l-t)r.  To avoid poverty  traps, I assume  that
(I  -a)(1-T)(co  + k') > k'.'3 This and assumption  1 then imply  that (l-)(1-X)r>1.
Figure 3  wt+,  450
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The implication  of Proposition  2 and of the specific  transition  function  given  by equation
(9) is that the long-run equilibrium  of this stochastic process is characterized  by an
invariant non-degenerate  wealth distribution,  with three 'social classes' defined by the
choice  of occupation  and/or investments  undertaken  by agents.  The poorest agents  choose
to work in the less productive  public sector, because the missing credit  markets prevent
them from borrowing  to invest at the minimum  scale required  in the private sector. They
earn a deterministic  wage equal to their average  product,  which is a linear  function of the
public sector capital stock. By assumption,  this wage is high enough in relation to the'
minimum  scale k' that everyone  in the public sector is able to bequeath  more than they
13 Which merely sets a upper bound on admissible values for the exogenous parameter k'.18
themselves started life with, so that the dream of having a descendant among the ranks of
the entrepreneurs will eventually always come true.
Between k'  and wC  we have middle-class agents, who invest their full wealth in the risky
private  sector production  function.  Every period,  some  of  these  succeed,  earning an
income high enough to leave their children a bequest higher than their initial income.
Upward mobility  in  the middle-class  is  a  function  of  entrepreneurial  success. But  a
fraction of them fail, consigning their children to start afresh as impoverished public-
sector workers in the next generation. Those whose ancestors have succeeded repeatedly,
eventually are rich enough that the  expected marginal product of  investing in private
capital is not worth the risk. They invest as much as is sensible (we) and simply save the
rest.  Although Proposition 2 and the associated Markov convergence theorems do not
specify a  functional  form  for  G*,  a  plausible  density  function  might  look  like  the
hypothetical example in Figure 4:
Figure 4  dG(w)
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3.  Privatization, Public Sector  Wages and the Distribution of Income
Let us now begin our investigation into the effects of policies associated with economic
transition on the distributions of income and wealth, by considering the privatization of
state assets. This will be modeled  as the transfer of a fraction  7t (0<7r<l) of the state-
owned productive assets S to private hands. The analysis below is primarily concerned19
with the short-run effects of privatization on the income  distribution. We proceed by
comparing the two periods immediately prior to and immediately after the privatization: I
denote the pre-privatization equilibrium values of all variables with the subscript zero,
and all post-privatization values with the subscript one. At the end of the section, I briefly
discuss the implications for the new equilibrium distribution towards which the system
eventually converges after the one-off privatization.
For simplicity, I assume that 7t is sufficiently small in relation to the extent of labour-
hoarding going on in the public sector that XI = aSI  still holds after the privatization.
Furthermore, since the  functional form of the  limiting steady-state distribution G* is
unknown, the analysis is conducted for representative agents of each class. These are
denoted by the subscripts P for the poorest class (w E [0, k')), M for the middle class (w
E  [k',  wc)), and R  for the uppermost class  (w E  [we, wj).  In particular,  since most
frequently used inequality measures are scale invariant, we shall be comparing the ratios
of  expected  post-privatization  (pre-tax)  end-of-period  income  to  the  expected  pre-
privatization (pre-tax) end-of-period income: E(yj 1 )/E(yjO),  i = P, M, R.
These  incomes,  and  the  effect  on  overall  inequality, clearly  depend  on  the  specific
privatization mechanism  adopted. Below  I  assume the  simplest  possible  mechanism:
shares  in  the  privatized  assets  are  simply  given  away  as  privatization  vouchers,
distributed uniformly to all citizens thus:
w.
7SO  = V |dG(W)  (=v)  (11)
0
Proposition 3: In the short run, a privatization process described by equation (11) will
unambiguously increase expected incomes in the upper and middle classes, but it may
lead to income reductions amongst the poor.
Proof  From equations (2') and (8), we have that:20
*  E(yRO)  = rwcga  + (w-WI)  and  E(y 1) = rw1-aga  + (w+  v-  )
Hence:  E(yRI)  - E(yRO)  = v and E(yRI)  / E(yRO)  > 1.
*  E(y, 0 )=rW  aga  and  E(ym 1)=r(w+v)l-aga.  Hence:
E(yMI)  (  w + v-A
=  >1.
E(yMO)  W
*  E(yv)=o  aS  +  0 +w  and  E(y,,)=o 1 ,  +,=  (I -7)S  0 +wo +v
where  f  =  JdGo  (w)/JdGo  (w). P denotes the proportion  of public sector employees
k'-v  IO
who exit the class and  join the ranks of middle-class  entrepreneurs,  as a result of the extra
capital  they  receive  as privatization  vouchers.  It follows  that L,, = (1- W3L0  I.Hence:
E(yPO)  aS 0 /Lso +  wo
sodtoa  "SO(7  - =  E(yPO)  (12')  0
Corollary:  If privatization leads to a (short-run) decline in public sector wages (the
absolute value of) which exceeds the value of the privatization  vouchers given to each
agent, then inequality between the poor and the entrepreneurial  classes will increase
unambiguously  in this transitional  period.
Proof:  This  follows  directly  from  the  end  of  the  proof  of  Proposition  3:
@ ° - @ I =s:(7C  P)  If  7r-, is sufficiently  large  that this difference  is greater than v,
then it was shown that end-of-period  incomes for the poor fall (equation 12'), while
expected incomes for the upper and middle classes rise. Inequality  between the poorest
class and the  other two therefore rises by  any measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton
transfer  principle.  U21
Notice that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for (12') to hold is that 7t > 1,  i.e.
that privatization leads to a proportional reduction in the amount of capital owned by the
state which is greater than the proportional reduction in the amount of labour employed
by the state. In other words, the more effective reformers are in enabling employees in an
obsolete segment of the public sector to move to alternative occupations in the private
sector (as entrepreneurs, in this simple model) relative to the amount of assets privatized,
the less likely it is that the privatization will hurt the remaining public sector employees.
If the obsolete public sector is, as in this model, effectively a safety-net employer of last
resort, staffed by the most vulnerable people in society, this may well be desirable from
an equity viewpoint.
Notice also that the corollary to proposition 3 and the condition expressed in equation
(12')  establish  a  sufficient,  but  not  necessary,  condition  for  inequality  between  the
poorest  class  and  the  private  sector  entrepreneurs  to  grow  with  privatization.  They
describe an extreme situation, in which incomes in the public sector actually fall in the
aftermath of privatization. Whilst the evidence from a number of countries reveals that
this can indeed happen, all that is required for inequality to rise is that any increase in
incomes there be proportionally less than those for the upper classes. Condition (12') is,
on the other hand, both necessary and sufficient for a short-run increase in poverty in this
model, since incomes fall unambiguously for all agents with wealth w E  [0, k').
The  general  results  above  are easily  interpreted.  Privatization  is  modeled  here  as  a
uniform transfer of capital from public to private ownership. Government D is assumed to
keep its two sectors separate and to maintain the provision of public capital g constant
during the privatization. The only government sector to be affected by the privatization
policy considered in this section is the productive sector, the output of which is exhausted
in the wage bill  of the (poor) public sector workers. This explains why entrepreneurial
agents (the upper  and  middle classes)  benefit  unambiguously from  privatization: they22
receive no benefits, direct or indirect, from government production of X, so that they do
not  lose at all  from a  reduction in  its  scale. And they receive  (an amount v of)  free
additional private capital, which adds to their total wealth and productivity. 14
The marginal benefits of privatization are therefore unambiguously positive  for them:
Recall that  E(YRI) = rw-aga  + (w+ v - wC)  ,  so  that  avRI)=  1.  Similarly, since
E(ymj=  r(w +v)l-g  ,(1a)r(w+  v)`g  >O." av
This is not the case for the poorest agents, whose class is defined by their occupation as
public  sector employees. In their  case, privatization  of state assets has  an ambiguous
overall impact, as a result of three separate effects. The first, and simplest, is the voucher
effect: receipt of the uniform transfer of size v also raises their initial wealth. Since they
simply save it, the marginal effect is exactly like that for the upper class. The other two
effects act through changes in the public sector wage rate (0)): the negative 'numerator
effect',  which follows from the fall in public sector output (X) due to reduced capital in
the sector (S), acts to lower the wage. The positive 'denominator effect' follows from the
fact  that  the  transfer  of  v  enables  a  share  of  the  public-sector  labour  force
14Note that  government  D keeps  the provision  of g at its historic  exogenous  level,  which  satisfied  all  the
assumptions  set out in Section  2, since  the taxes  collected  in the previous  period,  prior to privatization
yield exactly  that level of transfers.  In subsequent  periods during  the transition,  there may be an
additional  channel  for the impact  of privatization  on entrepreneurial  agents:  if economy-wide  output
rises with  privatization,  the tax rate X  required  to provide  g will fall. Naturally,  this does  not affect the
expected  incomes  used in the above propositions,  since  they are pre-tax.  But it will affect  utility, by
raising  consumption  and bequests  proportionately  by -AT.  This  would  only  affect periods  after the
immediate  short-run  impact  considered  here.
l  In fact, given the defnition of w,, which  implies  that  MPk is higher for the middle  class than for the
aE(yml)  M5(yR,I)
upper class,  >  . This implies  that, in this model,  the marginal  benefit  of
privatization  is greater  for the middle  class than for the very  rich, given diminishing  returns  to private
capital.23
k'
(PL.0O= fdGo(w)  )  to  purchase  the  private-sector's  minimum  scale  of  production
k'-  v
amount of capital: k'.  Assumption  1 then ensures that these agents choose to leave the
public sector and join the ranks of the enterprising middle-class. By reducing the number
of those who must share the (lower) new public-sector output as wages, this effect acts to
increase the post-privatization wage rate.
These three effects can be  seen  clearly in the expression  for the  marginal benefit  of
privatization for the public-sector employees. Rewrite E(ypl) as:
E(y,l)  = k  - (v  + wo  +  v,  and it follows that:
fdGo(w)
0
aE(yp,)  CO  IdGo(k'V)  (13)
+  (3
Uv~~  (-  W5)so  (1-  O5LSO
The three terms on the right-hand side of (13) are, respectively, the unit-valued voucher
effect, the negative wage nurnerator effect and the positive wage denominator effect. The
expressions are quite  intuitive: the marginal impact of an  extra unit of public capital
being  privatized  is  one  through  the  receipt  of  a  voucher;  minus  the  public-sector
productivity of that capital divided by the new number of wage recipients; plus the wages
given up by those moving out of the public sector, divided amongst those who stay. (13)
may,  of course,  be  positive  or  negative depending  on the  relative  strengths  of these
effects.
In  sum, proposition 3, its corollary  and equation (13) suggest that privatizations (of a
given size) are less likely to hurt the poor in the short run: (a) the lower the productivity
of capital in the public sector (a); and (b) the larger their effect on the mobility of labour
away from the inefficient public sector and into profitable private activities (13).  Naturally,
overall economic benefits also depend on the productivity of capital in the private sector24
(r). In practical terms, it is likely that the privatization of state owned assets will impose a
much less severe burden on the poor if conditions exist for people to move to the private
sector, either by starting their own small businesses (a low k'),  or by being employed in
someone  else's. 16  Cumbersome  licensing  procedures,  inefficient  or  missing  credit
markets, labour market restrictions and distortions, inexistent or thin land and property
markets are all factors which are both common to many transition economies and likely
to lower labour mobility into the more productive private sector.
Turning now to the new steady-state equilibrium towards which the system converges
after the original equilibrium is disturbed by privatization, we must  first note that the
transfer of the v vouchers to  all agents is clearly a one-off event. It  raises  individual
wealth  levels  at that time,  but  the  law of  motion  of wealth  in  equation  (9)  and the
stochastic nature of returns ensure that the extra pool of private wealth in the economy is
redistributed across lineages in the course of future generations. Proposition 2 will still
hold, but the exact wealth distribution  G** towards which the system  converges is in
general different from the pre-privatization distribution G*, since at least one parameter
in the transition function has changed: the public sector wage rate wo.  Whereas  o  =  - °  '
Lso
co  2  = a  °,  where the subscript 2 denote values in the post-privatization ergodic
L-2
distribution. A first concern is that (l-a)(I-T)(o  + k') > k'  should still hold for (02 , so as
to avoid poverty traps.
Naturally, if L,2 = L,O  , then 0) 2  < C 0 (since X > 0), and we have a situation where income
inequality between the poorest class and the entrepreneurial classes rises unambiguously
in the long-run after privatization, whatever the (ambiguous) short run effect. In this case,
since incomes fall for all agents with  w  E  [0, k'),  it will also be  possible to  say that
poverty increases, whatever the poverty line. However, it is impossible to know whether
16 A private  sector labour  market  is not modeled  in this paper,  to keep  the structure  as simple as possible.25
L,2=  L 5O, since the G** is a  different distribution from  G*, and hence density L,2 =
G**(k') ￿  G*(k') = Lso,  in general.
An issue which also deserves mention in this section is the applicability of this model to
total  privatizations  (7r=l). In that  case, government  D  transforms  itself  directly  into
govemment A, which concentrates only on the production of public capital, and does not
produce consumer goods with the obsolete technology  (3). Consequently, the poorest
class as defined here disappears. Whether this is the best possible policy for the poor in
the short run depends ultimately on whether SO  > k'.  If so, the privatization mechanism
given by (11) will ensure that all public sector employees can start their own private
businesses, and the whole society will - in a first instance - consist of middle- or upper-
class entrepreneurs. There are two problems, however. First, if SO  < k',  the poorest public
sector  workers  will  not  receive  enough  in  privatization  vouchers  to  purchase  the
minimum scale of production amount of capital k'. Deprived of a public sector in which
to work, these people would be forced to subsist on their own inadequate initial resources.
They would constitute a new underclass of idle people living at the margins of society.17
Second, even if SO  > k' and everyone is able to move up to the entrepreneurial class in the
first instance, these vouchers are a one-off transfer. As stated above, the post-privatization
equilibrium distribution G** will include agents with wealth less than k',  as a result of
entrepreneurial failures. In the absence of public sector employment, they would need
some alternative safety-net mechanism. The model reminds us that, since market systems
involve substantial risks to individual incomes, governments must accompany reductions
in the ability of the public-sector to act as an employer of last resort with measures to
create alternative safety nets, in the interests of both equity and long-term efficiency.
17  In fact, given the dynamics  of this particular  model,  this development  would  eventually  destroy  the
entire economy.  The  underclass  would  be locked in a poverty  trap which  would  eventually  - given  the
positive  probability  of failure  faced  by everyone  in the private  sector - attract  the whole  mass  of the
distribution.  To preserve  a non-degenerate  ergodic  wealth  set, some alternative  source  of income
would  have  to be found  for those  with wealth less  than k': unemployment  insurance;  private  sector
jobs, whatever.26
4.  Allowingfor  the Private Provision of Public Capital
But privatization is only one component of a much broader set of reforms which support
the  process  of  economic  transition  from  central  planning  to  a  functioning  market
economy.  A  transformation  at  least  as  important  as  any  other  is  the  creation  and
development of a number of markets which  may have previously been missing.  Some
such markets  may be  for public  capital  inputs  into private production,  as  defined in
Section 2. While services like health care, education, telecommunications, postal delivery
and security (policing) may indeed be characterized by large market failures, justifying
government intervention, nothing prevents private sector entrepreneurs from competing
with the government in their provision. In fact, because none of these services is a pure
public good, all of them having different degrees of excludability and rivalrousness  in
consumption, a coexistence of private and public provision is in fact observed in most
countries. In  many cases,  private  sector suppliers  specialize  in providing  "upmarket"
services, leaving poorer agents to consume the public alternatives. This section suggests
how  this  may  quite  naturally  develop,  and  investigates  the  consequences  of  the
development of these markets during economic transition for the distribution of income.
Let us consider the implications  of allowing  agents in  the private  sector to  purchase
additional quantities of public capital g from private suppliers. We continue to denote by
gg the amount of g uniformly distributed by the government, as in equations (5) and (6).
Let the amount of g privately purchased by any agent with wealth w be given by gp(w),
which will be written gp in short. gp is produced by private sector agents through the same
production function used to produce the consumer good, and units are chosen so that the
price is one.
The basic implication of allowing for a private market in public capital in this model is
that  this  enables  sufficiently  wealthy  agents  to  combine  k  and  g  in  the  optimal
proportions for production, rather than exhausting their wealth in private capital k alone.27
Recall that all our agents are risk neutral, and that the expected returns of private sector
production  are  given by  (2'):  E(y,jk 2k')  = rkl-aga.  To  the  extent  possible,  agents
therefore seek to combine inputs k and g in their production process so as to maintain the
k  1- a
optimal  input  ratio:  -=-.  When  inputs  are  combined  in  this  ratio,  (expected)
g  a
marginal products are identical:
MPk* = MPg*= raa (-  a)la  (14)
But because there is a minimum scale of production given by k',  and a free transfer of g =
gg, not all agents are able to produce with the optimal input ratio. In fact, subject to the
two additional assumptions below,  it is possible  to  show that with  private top-ups of
public capital, the model yields an end-of-period income function different from (8), and
hence a transition function of wealth different from (9). Whilst the limiting distribution is
still characterized by three occupational classes, they are no longer the same as in the
equilibrium described in Section 2. Below, we describe the new long-run equilibrium and
compare its distribution with that in Section 2. This comparison can be interpreted as a
comparative statics exercise between the pre-market-opening-reform equilibrium and the
post-market-opening-reform equilibrium.
Assumption 2: Let r be sufficiently high that the marginal products of public and private
capital at the optimal input ratio are greater than one:  MPk*= MPg* = raa (I - a)'-a > 1.
Assumption 3: Let the level of government-provided public capital gg be sufficiently high
that at the minimum amount of private capital k',  the marginal product of k exceeds that
of g:  MPk(k?)=r(I-a)k'-ag>  >rak l-agl  = MPg(k').
Definition: Let  w* be  a wealth  level  such that,  for the historic  level  of government-
provided public capital gg, MPk(w*)  = r(I - a)w *-a gga  =raw  *l-a  gga- =  MPg(w*)28
Proposition 4: In this economy, there are still three classes of agents, defined by their
occupation and sector of employment: the poorest agents, with wealth w < k', work in the
public sector for a deterministic wage ea. All agents with wealth greater than or equal to
k'  choose to become entrepreneurs in the risky private sector and invest all their wealth in
the production function (2). But there are two classes of entrepreneurs: those with wealth
between k'  and w* buy only private capital k', and have a k/g ratio less than the optimal.
Those with wealth greater than w* divide their initial wealth between k and gp, so as to
k  1- a
operate always at the optimal input ratio  -=  . The end-of-period (pre-tax) income
g  a
function is therefore given by:
y,(w, ,0,)  c,  + w,  for w, E [0,  k')
0 ,rw,  for w, E  [k', w*]  (15)
0,ry  (w)w,  for w, E (w*, u]
where y (w):  k  is the fraction of the agent's wealth spent on private capital.
k+gp(w)
Proof:  1) For agents with wealth w < k',  see Part (1) of the proof of Proposition 1.
2)  Agents  with  wealth  k'  <  w  <  w*  invest  their  full  wealth  in  k  because
Assumption  1 ensures that  it is worth investing  at least k'  in the private  sector; and
Assumption 3 and the definition of w* ensure that it is preferable to buy k than g over
that wealth range. Assumption 2 implies that it is preferable to invest their full wealth in
the production function (2) than to save. Once they do so, their return is Ot  rkt.
3) Agents with wealth w > w* allocate a positive share  1-y(w) of their wealth to
purchases of gp, so as to keep the input ratio at its optimal. The definition of w* ensures
that this is only sensible at wealth levels greater than it. Assumption 2 ensures that it is
always preferable to buy $a of gp  and $(l -a) of k than to save $1.  U
The law of motion of wealth is still given by equation (9):  w,+,  = (1  -a)(1-  r)y,(w,  ,O,),
but now y, (w, ,O,) is given by equation (15), rather than (8). Proposition 2 still holds, but29
since the transition function is a different one, so is the invariant limiting distribution. To
distinguish it from both the pre-transition long run equilibrium distribution G*, and from
the  post-privatization  equilibrium  distribution  G**,  let  us  now  call  the  limiting
distribution towards which the dynamic system described by (9) with y, (w, ,O,)  given by
equation (15) converges, G***.8
Assuming that the basic exogenous parameters of the model (r, a, a,  c, k', S) and that the
level  of gg are unchanged, two  outcomes are possible  in terms of the  distribution of
expected pre-tax incomes, depending on how G***(k') compares with G*(k'). It turns out
that in one case, there is an unambiguous welfare result, and in the other an unambiguous
inequality result.
Proposition  5: If G***(k')  < G*(k'),  then the distribution of expected pre-tax incomes
associated with G*** displays first-order stochastic dominance over the distribution of
expected  pre-tax  incomes  associated  with  G*.  Expected  welfare  is  therefore
unambiguously  higher in the post-market-opening equilibrium than in the pre-market-
opening equilibrium.
Proof: First-order dominance can be defined both in terms of distribution functions, or
their inverses, the Pen Parades. Here, dominance is established through the latter method,
by showing  that E[y(w) I  G***] 2 E[y(w) I G*],  Vw:
*  For w e [0, k'),
E  ly(w  I  G  =  S  _+w>  _  +w=E[y(w)  I G*].
G**(k')  GG*(k')
*  For w E [k', w*], E[y(w) I  G***] = rwl 1 ag.'  = E[y(w) I G*].
8For this limiting  distribution  G*** to exist,  the following  parametric  restriction  must hold:
r(I - a)(l  - r)(1 - a) < 1. This  can be seen as an upper bound  on r. It follows  from the fact  that
the upper-bound  of the new ergodic  set, wW  is defined  by setting w,+ = w, in
w,+,  = (1  -a  )(1  - )y (w)rw,. The  non-zero  solution  is given  by: (1  -a  )(1  - ')ry (w)  = 1,
where  y(w)  declines  motonically  from 1, with limw~y(w)  = I-a.30
*  For w E (w*, wj, E[y(w) I  =  r(yw)1-a  [gg + (1 -y  )W]  > rw Ia ga = E[y(w)
I G*]. The inequality follows from the fact that 7(w) is a control variable chosen by each
k  I  -a
agent so as to keep  - a  above w*. The marginal revenue on any dollar above w* is
g  a
lower if spent on k alone (as in G*), than if shared between k and gp (as in G***).
*  For w E (wC,  w%J,
E[y(w)IG***]=  r(yw)-a  [gg  +(1-Y  )W]  > rw,..aga  +(w-wc)  =E[y(w)  I G*].
The inequality follows from  Assumption 2:  For every dollar above w*, the expected
return  (raa(l  - a)'1a)  is higher in G*** than in G*. Since the returns on every dollar
until w* are identical for agents richer than k',  the total income for this  class must be
higher than in G*.  U
In this case, therefore, social welfare is unambiguously higher in the long-run equilibrium
after the market-opening reform than prior to  it. All expected incomes are at least the
same as before (and in many cases strictly greater), for any given wealth level, regardless
of one's  social class. This outcome is due to two effects. The first is an increase in the
higher incomes in the distribution, brought about by the ability to allocate one's  wealth
more  efficiently  through  topping  up  the  amounts  of public  capital provided  by  the
government,  thus  increasing  one's  probability  of  entrepreneurial success. The  second
effect is an increase in incomes in the bottom of the distribution, due to an increase in the
public sector wage rate. With unchanged public sector output aS, this is due entirely to a
fall in public sector employment: L, = G***(k'). Note that whereas the first effect is an
inherent consequence of the market-opening reform, the latter is only a possibility. The
functional form of G*** is unknown, and the mass below k'  might therefore be either
greater or lower than for G*.
In this  first case, with  G***(k')  < G*(k'),  public sector employment falls, causing the
wage to  rise. As a result, although  changes in welfare (in terms of the distribution  of31
expected  incomes)  are unambiguous,  the same can not be said of changes in inequality.
These will largely depend on the proportional rise in public sector wages, versus the
proportional  rises in upper-class  expected  entrepreneurial  incomes.
As noted above, however,  the population  mass below k' may also be greater  in the post-
reform  equilibrium  than  in the pre-reform  equilibrium:
Proposition  6:  If  G***(k') >  G*(k'),  then (expected) income inequality between
representative  agents of the three classes rises unambiguously  between the pre-reform
equilibrium  associated  with G* and the post-reform  equilibrium  associated  with G***.
Proof:  Let the pre-reform  equilibrium  variables  be denoted  by the subscript  0, and the
post-reform  equilibrium  variables  by the subscript  1. Let the representative  agent of each
of the three classes  be subscripted  P, M and R, as in Section  3. The unambiguous  rise in
inequality  follows from a fall in the expected income of P, no change in the expected
income of M, and a rise in the expected  income of R, as follows:
*  E(ypl)=cJ,+w  =  ++W<G  S  +W=Wo 0+W=E(yPO)
G (k')  G *(kf)
*  E(yMI)  = rwlag'  = E(yMO  )
*  E(yRI)  =  r(yw)  a[gg  +(1I-y)W]I  >  rw.-ago  +(w-wC)  = E(YRO)-  (See the
proof of Proposition  5.)  U
In this second case, merely because public sector employment  increased, causing the
wage  rate to fall,  the beneficial  impact  of the market-opening  reform  appears  substantially
less general. Only the  (expanded)  upper class sees rises in their expected incomes.
Inequality  rises unambiguously  between  the three classes,  and for any poverty  line below
y(w*),  poverty  also rises.  This can be interpreted  as suggesting  that the creation  of private
suppliers of services previously  provided only by the public sector, such as health care
and education,  benefits  only those who are rich enough  to consider  topping up the public32
provision. Even though there is  no requirement that a  minimum amount of  gp be
purchased,  poorer agents do not benefit from the new markets,  because they are either
precluded  from employing  its benefits in any production  function  at all, or because  they
still choose to use all of their wealth  to buy private capital.  The only way in which  these
new markets can help the poor is if they somehow  reduce  the mass of people constrained
to the public sector (G***(k')),  perhaps  through  increased  efficiency  and reduced failure
rates in the private sector.
Figure 5 below illustrates  the results from the last three propositions.  The expected  end-
of-period  incomes are plotted on the upper panel, while expected  marginal products are
plotted in the bottom  panel. For agents with wealth  between 0 and k', incomes are given
by the line segment  AB, along the o  + w line. When wealth reaches  k',  agents become
able to invest in the risky (but more profitable)  private sector production  function.  There
is a discontinuity  in the income  function,  and agents with wealth  between k' and w* earn
incomes along the curve CD. At D, the marginal product of private capital (k) equals
ra!(1-a) -a, and hence the marginal  product of public capital  (g). With private markets  for
gp  available,  as in G***, agents with wealth greater  than w* share their wealth  between  k
and gp, so as to keep producing  at the optimal input ratio k/g = (l-a)/a, and hence their
incomes  are plotted  along DE, until w.,, the upper  bound  of their ergodic  set. 19
In the pre-market-opening-reform  equilibrium  distribution  G*, agents could not top up
the government  transfers  of g privately,  so that they kept purchasing  k until its expected
marginal product fell below 1, the return to simnply  storing wealth. This happened  at w¢,
so that middle-class  expected incomes were then plotted along the arc CF. At F, agents
became saver/storers,  in addition to the amount w, they invested in the private sector.
Their incomes  were then plotted along FG. To understand  propositions  5 and 6, note that
19  Note that k, rather than w, is on the x-axis. Beyond, w*, the amount of k purchased by agents (yw),
which yields E(y) along DE, is strictly less than w. This is why, although DE is a line with slope
greater  than one, there  nevertheless  exists  an upper  bound  to the ergodic  distribution.  At w,  so much
of w is spent on gp that the bequest left of the successful person's income is only the same as w,..33
the curve CD is common  to both income  functions  (whether  under G* or G***).  This is
the part of the middle class which  remains  middle class after the reforms,  by virtue of not
being sufficiently rich to purchase privately supplied public capital. Above point D,
expected incomes are unambiguously  greater in the post-reform  equilibrium (DE lies
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Proposition  5 refers to the case when the mass of people with wealth below k'  in the
limiting distribution  is lower in G*** than in the pre-reform  equilibrium  G*. Then, the
public sector  wage rate o rises, shifting  the AB segment  up. In that case, it is easy to see
that no expected incomes in the post reform situation are lower than in the pre-reform
situation, for the same initial wealth level. This is what generates the unambiguous
increase  in (expected)  welfare  described  in Proposition  5. Inequality  may or may not have
risen,  depending  on how much co  rose  by, compared  to gains  above w*.
Proposition  6, on the other hand, refers  to the case when the mass of people with wealth
below  k' in the limiting  distribution  is greater  in G***  than in the pre-reform  equilibrium
G*. Then,  the public sector  wage  rate o falls,  shifting  the AB segment  down. In that case,
incomes for the poorest class are lower in the post-reform  equilibrium than before;
expected  incomes for the (remaining)  middle class are unchanged;  and expected  incomes
for  the  (enlarged) upper  class are  greater. Inequality between the  classes  rises
unambiguously.
T'he  overall message from this section is that the creation of private markets for public
capital (e.g. education, health care, some infrastructure, telecommunications),  which
enables  investors  to top up public provision  by allocating  resources  to private purchases
of these services, contributes to  economic efficiency but has ambiguous effects on
welfare.  Efficiency  gains  are clear:  even if public sector  wages  fall, public  sector  output is
unchanged,  and there are always gains in the private sector. As for the distribution of
these gains, propositions 5 and 6 reveal that, while richer agents always gain, poorer
workers may  either  gain  or  lose,  depending on  what happens to  public sector
employment. If  their  incomes decline,  inequality in  expected incomes will  be
unambiguously  higher in the post-reform  long-run equilibrium.  Even if their incomes
rise, but by proportionately  less than those of the rich, some  measures  of inequality  will
indicate  an increase.  This is an example  of the sort of policy reforn likely  to lead to more
efficient,  but also more unequal,  societies  in the long run.35
5.  Returns to Skills and Volatility in the Labour Market
We have so far focused on the differential  impacts  of reforms  - such as privatization  or
market openings  - on social classes characterized  by their different  occupational  choices.
The model shed light on the mechanisms  through which these transformations  affected
people differently,  depending on whether they worked for a safe but inefficient  public
sector,  or risked  it out on their own as entrepreneurs  in the new private sector.  Within  that
sector it was argued that, under plausible assumptions about the interaction  between
public and private capital  in the production  function,  expected  returns  differed  depending
on whether  one's wealth level allowed for purchases  of privately  provided  education  and
health care, say. The analysis of the  model suggested circumstances under which
efficiency-augmenting  policies,  such as privatization  or creating  new markets,  might lead
to increased inequality (and in some cases poverty), through lowering the incomes of
those unable to  enter the private sector, or  through increasing the incomes of the
wealthiest  segment  of the population  disproportionately.
One important  omission  from this stylized  model  has been any treatment  of the emerging
private sector labour market.  Naturally,  our treatment of the private sector as consisting
of atomistic  household-firms  should not be taken too literally; k can be interpreted as
private human capital and returns Ork could be seen as a wage rate which is linear in
human  capital  and subject  to random employment  shocks.  Nevertheless,  the focus of the
foregoing analysis was indeed on  private physical wealth and  its effect on  broad
occupational  choices and incomes, rather than on human capital and skills. This has
meant that we have largely ignored a third and important potential source of increased
inequality in economies in transition, namely an increase in the dispersion  of labour
earnings  due  to changes  in the pattern  of returns  to skills.36
In particular,  two changes  are likely to have taken place  in the earnings structure  in these
economies: an increase in the returns to education at all levels of schooling, as the
artificially compressed  wage structure under central planning is replaced by market
pricing for different types of labour; and an increase in the volatility of (real) pay,
reflecting  reduced security  in employment,  greater  risks of business  failure,  unpredictable
rates of inflation,  etc. Both of these changes,  which are essentially  inherent  in the greater
flexibility required of  a  functioning labour market, can lead to  increased earnings
inequality even if  there is no change at all in the underlying distribution of skills.
Consider the standard earnings functions often estimated in  empirical studies of the
labour  market:
logyj, = _  *logxi,  + s j,  (16)
where yi, denotes the earnings of individual i in period t; x is a vector of individual
characteristics,  such as years of schooling,  years of experience,  gender,  race, etc; £  is a
stochastic term; and the parameter pi in vector J  can be interpreted as the "earnings
elasticity"  of characteristic  xi,  providing  some  indication  of its labour market  return.
In  order to  focus more narrowly on  returns to  skills, suppose the  true  earnings
determination  model  in our transition  economy  is given  simply  by:
logy 1, = J3,  logsi, + logO  j,  (17)
where sit denotes  some  measure of the level of skills" embodied  in individual  i at time t,
and  e  =logO,  - i.d.  N(O,a 2,).  Let us also assume that this transitional society is
characterized  by a lognormal  distribution  of skills, so that log si  - N(11 ,a 2  ). Let log 0
and log s be distributed  independently  of any current  or lagged  value of each other. log 0
is also distributed independently  of its own lagged values, but need not be identically
distributed  over time. P is a constant  across individuals  i, and is determined  exogenously
at each time t.
20 This  could be a standard  proxy  such as years of formal  schooling,  or a more complex  indicator,
incorporating  years of experience  and/or  quality  adjustments.37
Equation (17)  can  then  be  rewritten as  yj, =0 ,,sP,  with  s  LN(  and
0-  LN(O,ai, ). Being the product of two lognormals,  it follows that earnings  are also
distributed  lognormally,  as follows:
Yit  a  LN(,ps,p,2aC  +  f,)  (18)
It is then immediate  to  see how the two transformations  discussed above impact the
distribution.  First, an increase  in the education  elasticity of earnings P (the 'returns to
education')  will raise  both the mean and the dispersion  of the earnings  distribution.  Mean
eamings rise, since  the return  on the mean level of education  has risen. But a rise in , will
also increase  the variance  of the lognormal  distribution  of earnings,  even if there has been
no change in the variance of the underlying distribution  of skills (a  2 ).  As one would
expect, the move from a compressed  earnings-education  profile under central  planning  to
a steeper one in a freer labour market contributes  to a further skewing of the earnings
distribution.
A second mechanism  through which transition to a freer labour market may lead to
increases  in the dispersion  of the earnings distribution  is a decline in the 'security' of an
individual's earnings, arising from an increase in volatility. There is some riskiness
associated  with one's earnings  under any situation,  which is embodied in the stochastic
term cit in equation (16) (or Oit in equation 17). This term captures shocks such as
illnesses, unemployment,  bankruptcy  of one's employers,  bad weather, poor harvests,
recessions,  etc. It is reasonable  to suppose  that the variance  of these shocks, at ,, is higher
in a market economy  than under central planning.  In the former,  unemployment  is more
widespread;  earnings  are more responsive  to macroeconomic  shocks; firms go bankrupt
(and start up) more often; business  deals fail astoundingly  (or succeed explosively)  more
often than in the latter. Greater efficiency  comes at the cost of greater volatility, higher
risk. Ceteris paribus, a higher variance for the stochastic term so,  means a greater
variance for the earnings distribution. Combined with  an increase in  the returns to38
education (,B),  this suggests that the transformations in the structure of earnings likely to
be  associated with  the labour market transition  from central planning  will lead to  an
increase in the dispersion of the distribution of earnings. This adds another mechanism to
those considered in Sections 3 and 4, through which economic reforms associated with
the process of economic transition can increase income inequality, despite their beneficial
(long-term) effects on efficiency.
6.  Conclusions.
This paper investigates ways in which some of the economic transformations associated
with transition from central planning to a market system affect the distribution of income.
Most of the analysis relies on a dynamic model of wealth distribution and occupational
choice, in which agents choose between working for a deterministic wage in a (relatively
inefficient) public  sector and being entrepreneurs  in  a risky private  sector, where  the
probability of success increases with the availability of public capital. Credit markets are
assumed  to  be  (extremely)  imperfect,  and  there  is  a  minimum  scale  of  production
required  for participation in the private  sector. The model yields a steady-state wealth
distribution in which the poorest agents are unable to invest in the private sector, and are
constrained to safe but low-paying public sector employment. Richer agents invest in the
new, risky private sector and can be further divided between a middle-class, where people
exhaust their  initial wealth  in production,  and  an  upper  class,  where  some  wealth  is
(risklessly) stored, in addition to the private sector investments.
The  effects  of a  privatization  of  some  of the  government's  productive  assets  on the
expected incomes of households differ along this wealth distribution. As a result, even if
privatization  is  designed  to  be  equitable,  with  assets  uniformly  distributed  through
vouchers amongst the population, it turns out that inequality may rise both in the short
and  in  the  long  run.  In  the  short  run,  the  middle  and  upper  classes  stand  to  gain
unambiguously,  since they are able to  channel the extra capital they receive from the39
government into their own private production functions, increasing their expected returns.
The impact on the welfare of the poor is more complex, since the privatization is likely to
affect the public sector wage rate, from which they derive most of their incomes. If wages
are set to equal the public sector average product of labour, a reduction in its capital stock
which exceeds any reduction in public employment will lower the wage, and this effect
may  be  sufficient  to  outweigh  short-term  gains  from  the  receipt  of  a  privatization
voucher. If barriers to entry into the new private sector are large, and privatization fails to
move  a  substantial  number  of  public  employees  to  alternative,  more  productive
occupations, then the decline in the public sector wage rate will lead to greater inequality
and  deeper poverty in  the transition economy. If the transfer of labour to  alternative
occupations outside the public sector continues to be insufficient in the long run, so that
the new equilibrium is characterized by a government which has lost more capital than it
has  shed workers, it is likely  that the new  steady-state will also be  characterized by
greater inequality and poverty (for at least some poverty lines).
Another transformation which is likely to increase economic efficiency but also lead to
greater inequality is the creation of markets where private sector entrepreneurs can buy
and sell substitutes to 'public capital'  goods, such as education and health services, toll
roads, etc. Whilst this transformation will not hurt the poor - unless it somehow leads to
an increase in public sector employment - it is very likely to benefit the rich much more
than the poor. This is because only richer agents will find it worthwhile to channel their
private  resources  to  pay  for  extra  (or  better)  schools,  health  insurance  and  cellular
telecommunications,  rather  than investing  it  in  straight-forward private  capital. As  a
result, though, the expected returns from their investments rise, and the distance between
their incomes and those of the remaining middle class and the poor increases. Once again,
the increase in inequality will be the smaller, the greater the impact of the reform in terms
of enabling people to escape public employment into a more productive private  sector
occupation.40
Finally, substantial  changes taking place in the labour market are certain to affect the
distribution  of final incomes  in transition  economies.  While we did not model the private
sector labour market explicitly,  a simple earnings equation was used to suggest that an
increase in  the  slope  of  the  earnings-education profile  - due  presumably to  a
"decompression"  of the wage structure  prevalent under central planning  - will increase
the dispersion  of the earnings  distribution,  even if the underlying  distribution  of skills  has
not changed.  This effect  may be compounded  by an increase  in the volatility  of earnings,
due perhaps  to greater risks of unemployment  or business failures in a market economy.
A greater variance in the probability distribution of any such random shock will also
increase  the variance  in the cross-section  distribution  of earnings.
Overall,  the analysis  illustrated  a number  of specific  mechanisms  through  which policies
and  developments which  increase economic efficiency (measured by  equilibrium
economy-wide  output)  are likely  to lead to greater inequality  and, in some cases, higher
poverty.  These results may attain even in the long run, with new limiting (steady-state)
distributions  characterized  by greater inequality  than prior to the transition.  Whenever  the
incomes accruing to the poor actually decline, while average incomes rise, there is a
classic  equity-efficiency trade-off.  In  those  cases,  greater  efficiency  does  not
automatically  imply higher social  welfare, and policy  implications  depend  on a normative
judgement.
Given how inefficient  systems  based on state ownership  and central  planning  turned out
to be, the question will almost certainly not be whether these efficiency-augmenting
reforms should take place, but  how. The general lesson that can be derived from this
paper is that - since economic reform takes place in the context 'f  an existing non-
degenerate wealth distribution, and with incomplete and imperfect markets - explicit
attention  should be paid to equity  objectives.  Greater  efficiency  is not sufficient  to imply
higher social welfare. In particular,  reformers  should seek to ensure  three things: that the
state  continues to  produce goods and  services in  which market failures outweigh
government  failures - such as law and order, primary education,  basic health care, rural41
infrastructure  - and which are in many cases indispensable  to a successful  private sector;
that new profitable  opportunities  in the private sector are available  to poor people too,
enabling  them to leave the inefficient  segments  of the old public sector and to benefit
from the greater  prosperity  to be achieved  elsewhere;  and that provisions  exist to protect
minimum  standards  of welfare for the poorest  people. The ergodic  nature  of this model's
limiting distribution  is a reminder that, over the long-run, all lineages face a positive
probability  of finding  themselves  among  the poor, and thus benefit from whatever  safety
nets have been put in place to provide  them with a minimum  income and a chance for
subsequent  upward mobility. The market economy is an inherently  risky system; by
replacing  the public sector employer  of last resort with suitable  altemative safety nets,
today's reformers  may  be looking  after the welfare  of their grandchildren's  children.42
Append&x
Proof of Lemma 1: By contradiction.  Suppose E[MPk(w.)] >1. Then the third class
defined  in proposition  1 would  not exist,  since all agents  in the ergodic  distribution  would
invest  all their initial wealth  in production  function  (2). Then, rather  than setting  wt+ = wt
in  w, 1 = (1  -aXl  -t)[rwc  + (w, - wj)],  which  yields  (10),  we  would  search  for  an
upper bound by setting wt+l = wt in  w,,1 = (1 - a)(I  - X )[rw, ], the only solution to which
is w = 0, implying  the inexistence  of an ergodic set. If an ergodic set exists, its upper
bound exceeds any wealth level such that E[MPk(w)]  >  1 . Since  E[MPk] < O, Vk, it
ak
follows  that E[MPk(w.)]  <1.E043
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